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Abstract: Embedded software is at the core of current and 
future telecommunication, automotive, multimedia, and 
industrial automation systems. The success of practically any 
industrial application depends on the embedded software 
system’s dependability, and one method to verify the 
dependability of a system is testing its robustness. The 
motivation behind this study is to provide a knowledge base of 
the state of the practice in robustness testing of embedded 
software systems and to compare this to the state of the art. We 
have gathered information on the state of the practice in 
robustness testing from seven different industrial domains 
(telecommunication, automotive, multimedia, critical 
infrastructure, aerospace, consumer products, and banking) by 
conducting thirteen semi-structured interviews. We investigate 
different aspects of robustness testing, such as the general view 
of robustness, relation to requirements engineering and design, 
test execution, failures, and tools. We highlight knowledge 
from the state of the practice of robustness testing of embedded 
software systems. We found different robustness testing 
practices that have not been previously described. Our study 
shows that the state of the practice, when it comes to robustness 
testing, differs between organizations and is quite different 
from the state of the art described in the scientific literature. For 
example, methods commonly described in the literature (e.g., 
the fuzzy approach) are not used in the organizations we 
studied. Instead, the interviewees described several ad-hoc 
approaches that take specific scenarios into account (e.g., power 
failure or overload). Other differences we found concern 
classification of robustness failures, the hypothesized root 
causes of robustness failures, and the types of tools used for 
robustness testing. The study is a first step in capturing the state 
of the practice of robustness testing of embedded software 
systems. The results can be used by both researchers and 
practitioners. Researchers can use our findings to understand 
the gap between the state of the art and the state of the practice 
and develop their studies to fill this gap. Practitioners can also 
learn from this knowledge base regarding how they can 
improve their practice and acquire other practices. 
 
KEY WORDS: testing, interviews, robustness, embedded 
systems, survey, state of the practice, state of the art. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Among various techniques used to verify and validate a 
software system, testing is most frequently used for evaluating 
the quality of software [1]. If properly conducted, testing may 
provide an efficient and rigorous way for error identification 
[2]. Testing of embedded software systems is a great challenge 
[1], as there are various characteristics of such systems that 
need to be considered while performing testing. In particular, 
Qian and Zheng [3], identify four characteristics that 
distinguish testing of embedded software system from testing 
of general software.  
First, embedded software systems are developed to perform 
a specific task in a specific environment, and the challenge for 
the tester is to test the system in a host-based or target-based 
context. Second, interaction is an important characteristic in the 
operation of embedded software systems. Embedded systems 
typically operate in, and interact with, an external environment 
by collecting data through sensors and acting upon this 
collected data through actuators. Failure of recreating this 
interaction during testing may lead to inadequate or erroneous 
conclusions. The third characteristic of embedded software 
systems is the development practice, where various interfaces 
and supporting platforms play important roles. The fourth 
distinguishing characteristic of embedded software systems is 
timeliness, meaning that the correctness of the embedded 
systems’ behavior depends not only on what the system does 
but when it does so. Hence, timeliness adds an extra dimension 
to testing. Traditional software testing methods are useful for 
identifying functional errors and attaining a high test coverage 
in embedded software systems, but may not be comprehensive 
enough to uncover robustness problems that occur because of 
environment errors such as unexpected or erroneous input 
values [4]. Robustness is defined by the IEEE standard 610.12-
1990 as “The degree to which a system or component can 
function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful 
environmental conditions” [5].  
Characteristics like robustness are particularly challenging 
for embedded software systems as their execution environments 
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cannot fully be foreseen at the time of development [2]. 
Robustness testing requirements can range from very general 
considerations to more specific requirements. General 
considerations are, for example, no run-time errors, no crashes 
or no deadlocks. More specific requirements are, for example, 
the capability of a system to always return to a nominal state 
after entering a degraded state, or that some system resources 
remain available for high-priority tasks [2]. However, there 
could be many interpretations of robustness testing and hence, 
many differences in how it is performed in various contexts. As 
described by Huhns and Holderfield [6], robustness testing of 
software system concerns how to test its ability to avoid crash. 
Fault tolerance as a concept is also widely used in robustness. 
Fault tolerance techniques are used “to meet design 
dependability requirements” [7]. Therefore, robustness testing 
often aims to assess the systems’ fault tolerance. 
Considering most of the definitions related to robustness, the 
main aim is to test the capability of the software system to 
handle adverse situations caused by internal or external factors 
[8]. In addition, the relation of robustness to other dependability 
attributes such as reliability, stability, availability, and 
performance is disputed [8]. For example, in the EMISQ model 
[9], robustness is described as part of the reliability of a system, 
even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the ISO 9126 
standard [10]. 
The understanding of robustness within the scientific 
community seems relatively consistent. The knowledge on state 
of the practice in robustness testing of embedded systems is 
however not very mature. To our knowledge, Eldh and 
Sundmark [8] performed the only industrial case study so far to 
identify the common practices of robustness testing in large-
scale telecom systems. They identified key challenges related 
to the understanding of robustness at different levels such as 
design level, unit level, and system level. From their work it 
could be emphasized that there is sometimes a lack of 
understanding of robustness in industry and that the view of 
robustness may vary considerably between companies and 
industrial contexts. As we know so little about state of the 
practice in various contexts, we do not have a clear view of the 
gap between state of the art and state of the practice. Because 
of this, there is a risk that researchers do not address relevant 
and urgent problems or that they fail to define feasible 
solutions. 
The objective of this study is to explore state of the practice 
of robustness testing of embedded software systems and to 
compare this to the state of the art. The contribution of this 
study is, therefore, twofold: First, it highlights the industrial 
practices of robustness testing of embedded software systems, 
and contributes in building the knowledge about robustness 
testing. Second, it allows us to highlight the gaps and 
differences between the theoretical (academic) and the practical 
(industrial) knowledge of the subject. 
This paper presents the results of an empirical study 
conducted in seven different embedded software system 
domains. The study is exploratory and aims at investigating the 
current state-of-the-practice robustness testing of embedded 
software systems. Data acquisition is performed through semi-
structured interviews with one or multiple interviewees for each 
industrial domain, and the data is then analyzed through a 
qualitative data analysis technique. Results of the study indicate 
that the industrial practice of robustness testing is clearly 
distinct from what has been previously described in the 
scientific literature. We describe the state of the practice and 
identify the gap between state of the art and state of the practice 
of robustness testing.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, related work 
is presented in detail. In Section 3, the research method is 
presented, and Section 4 discusses results with a focus on 
various challenging areas as described. In Section 5 the 
discussion on results is made and validity of the findings is 
analyzed. Finally, in Section 6 the conclusions are summarized 
with indications of future research. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
This section describes related work on robustness testing of 
embedded software system. 
Definition of robustness: Robustness is often considered to 
be a quality for achieving higher dependability [11]. In the 
scientific literature, software robustness is defined explicitly, 
e.g. by the 610.12-1990 IEEE standard glossary of software 
engineering terminology [5]. However this not the only 
definition of robustness; considering the work of Lei et al., the 
notions such as invalid inputs and stressful environment 
conditions can be ambiguous depending on the value of the 
invariant and the pre-condition before execution [12]. 
Consequently, alternative definitions exist: Lussier et al. [13] 
define robustness as “the delivery of a correct service in 
implicitly-defined adverse situations arising due to an 
uncertain system environment (such as an unexpected obstacle 
or a change in lightning condition affecting sensors)”. 
Shahrokni and Feldt define robustness considering the 
industrial context by stating that “robustness is interpreted as 
stability in presence of erroneous input and execution stability 
in presence of stressful environment created by external 
services or modules” [11]. In general, the widespread informal 
definition of robustness is that a system should show acceptable 
behavior in spite of exceptional or unforeseen operating 
conditions [2]. 
Fault injection: Fault injection has been used as a common 
practice for robustness testing [14][15]. Fault injection is a 
technique for testing the response of a system to a fault that is 
artificially induced. Two approaches have mainly been used 
when testing robustness by means of fault injection. The fuzz 
approach tests software with random and crafted streams of 
inputs, looking for system crashes. The aim of this approach is 
to quantify the software systems from an interactive user’s 
viewpoint [14]. The other approach, called benchmarking, uses 
fault injection by passing a combination of exceptional inputs 
as a parameter through the API of the software under test to 
detect crashes and hangs [15].  
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Common robustness failures and reasons: In the scientific 
literature, robustness testing of particularly operating systems 
has been studied exclusively [4][15][16][17][18][19]. Notably, 
failures in an operating system context have been characterized 
by means of the CRASH benchmark. CRASH is a five-level 
categorical description of robustness failures i.e. Catastrophic, 
Restart, Abort, Silent and Hindering. The CRASH failures are 
defined in [15] as: 
 
 Catastrophic failure: “The Catastrophic class of failure 
occurs when a failure is not contained within a single task. 
In other words, this level of failure means that a call to an 
OS function has caused other tasks, or even the system 
itself, to crash or hang. A Catastrophic failure typically 
requires a hardware reset of the entire system, but may 
possibly be limited to a warm restart of the OS”.  
 
 Restart failure: “The Restart class of failure occurs when a 
single task hangs, resulting in the need to kill and restart 
that task to return to normal execution”. 
 
 Abort failure: “The Abort class of failure occurs when a 
single task experiences an abnormal termination. A typical 
abnormal termination is caused by a segmentation 
violation, in which the task attempts to access memory to 
which it does not have access permissions (for example, by 
dereferencing a null pointer)”. 
 
 Silent failure: “The Silent class of failure occurs when 
invalid parameters are submitted to an OS call, but neither 
an error return code nor other task failure is generated. 
For example, a call to open a file with a NULL filename 
might return a success flag, instead of an error flag”. 
 
 Hindering failure: “The Hindering class is so named 
because the OS is hindering correct diagnosis of a problem 
by providing an incorrect error code. For example, an 
invalid memory access code returned when the only 
erroneous input is an invalid file handle value would be a 
hindering-class failure”. 
 
While many studies characterize robustness failures 
according to CRASH, some of these studies also highlight the 
reasons for these failures. Concerning the ‘Catastrophic’ 
failures, Lei  et al. [20] studied state-based robustness testing of 
components and found that if the service replies with an error 
message or exception that indicates the occurrence of an 
unexpected internal problem, then this might lead to a 
catastrophic failure. In addition they also found that an 
unchecked exception thrown to a script without being declared, 
and user-defined checked exceptions, which indicates the 
component is in an incorrect state and not performing its 
functionality, can lead to catastrophic failures. Schmid et al. 
[21], found after evaluating the robustness of Windows NT 
software that if a program fails to handle an exception thrown 
by an OS function or a divide-by-zero exception it is most likely 
to crash. Koopman and DeVale [18] studied the exception 
handling effectiveness of the POSIX operating system and 
found that system calls with exceptional parameter values can 
lead to catastrophic failures.  
Concerning the ‘Restart‘ failure, Fernsler and Koopman [19], 
found that internal errors such as failure of any function that 
required killing any task, lead to restart failure. Similarly, 
concerning the ‘Abort’ failure, Koopman and DeVale [16] in 
their study of comparing various POSIX operating systems 
based on robustness found that data types such as invalid file 
pointers (excluding null), null file pointers, invalid buffer 
pointers, minint integers, and maxint integers are associated 
with abort failures. In addition Koopman and DeVale in another 
study [18] found that if a signal is sent from the system call or 
library function to itself, causing an abnormal task termination, 
this could lead to the abort failure. Concerning ‘Silent’ failures, 
Koopman and DeVale [18] also found that if exceptional inputs 
to a module under test resulted in erroneous indication of 
successful completion, it might lead to a silent failure. It should 
however be noted that the above results may be highly context-
specific, and it is difficult to draw any general conclusions 
regarding the extent to which certain types of faults are more 
prone to cause robustness failures. 
In the scientific literature, there are some identified causes of 
robustness failures that have not been linked to any particular 
category of CRASH. For example Fernsler and Koopman found 
in their study [19] that internal exception handling errors 
(actually a segmentation violation caught semi-gracefully), 
unknown exceptions (exception-handling software defects) and 
segmentation faults (exceptions that evaded the exception 
handlers) are reasons for robustness failures. Miller et al. [14], 
found many reasons for robustness failures. For example, errors 
in the use of pointer and array subscripts dominate to produce 
such failures. They found that dangerous input functions, such 
as the gets() function is a common root cause of robustness 
failures, because gets() has no parameter to limit the length of 
the input data. In addition they also found that conversion of 
numbers from one size to another would result in a robustness 
failure. Lei et al. [12] found that particular conditions such as 
division by zero, integer overflow null reference, and array out 
of bounds access can result in a robustness failure. 
Robustness testing tools: There are some tools that have 
been used and studied for robustness testing. The most often 
studied tool is the Ballista tool, which is used to test the 
robustness of operating systems [16][18][19]. In addition, the 
tool Riddle has been used to test robustness of Windows NT 
[22]. For the robustness of UNIX utilities and services, the tool 
Fuzz has been used [14][23]. It should be noted that most of 
these tools are quite dated. Considering various application 
domains, different tools have been developed and studied in the 
scientific literature. For example, for Java-based applications, 
the automatic Java-based JCrasher tool is used to test the 
robustness of Java programs [24]. In addition Robut, a stated-
based robustness testing tool has been used to test robustness of 
Java components [20]. The automated tool WebSob has been 
used for robustness testing and response analysis of web 
services [25]. 
Robustness testing in different domains: In the scientific 
literature, most evidence shows that robustness is mainly 
2169-3536 (c) 2015 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2544951, IEEE Access
 
performed and studied for operating systems with the objective 
to test the operating systems’ dependability [4][14][26]. In 
addition, some studies perform a dependability comparison 
between operating systems based on their robustness 
[15][16][17][18]. There are few studies that focus on testing 
robustness in other domains than operating systems. One of the 
few examples is from the telecommunication systems domain, 
where Eldh and Sundmark [8] performed a case study on how 
robustness testing is performed in mobile telecommunication 
systems. Another example from the same context is Johansson 
et al. [27], who developed T-Fuzz, a novel fuzzing framework 
for testing robustness of telecommunication protocols. 
Concerning middleware systems, two studies [28][29] describe 
a methodology for executing robustness tests on high 
availability middleware solutions. Lei et al. [12] highlighted a 
method to perform robustness testing of components using a 
semantic model. Similarly, Ali et al. [30] model the system 
using the aspect-oriented modeling technique to support 
robustness testing. They use a video conferencing system for 
their studies. Concerning web based projects, Laranjeiro et al. 
[31] use text classification algorithms that are applied to test the 
web services’ robustness. Finally, Belli et al. [32] propose a 
model using event sequence graphs (ESG) and decision tables 
(DT) for robustness testing of web based system. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded from the literature that: 
 Most existing work in robustness testing focus on the 
robustness of software, but very few of these studies focus on 
testing the robustness of embedded software systems, 
 Except one, all studies focus on the state-of-the-art 
perspective. Not much is known about the state of the practice 
of robustness testing.   
 State-of-the-art only defines the robustness testing of specific 
domains. Therefore it is challenging to have this information 
from different domains. 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this section, the research method is presented. The 
description includes the research objectives, the research 
method, the preparation, the selection of participants and study 
instruments, and how data from the interviews have been 
collected, extracted and analyzed.  
3.1 Research objective and design 
 
3.1.1 Definition of objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to understand the state 
of the practice of robustness testing of embedded software 
systems, and build empirical knowledge about it. Particularly 
this study aims to address the following research question: 
                                                          
1 https://www.linkedin.com/ 
RQ: What is the state of the practice in robustness testing of 
embedded software systems? 
 
3.1.2 Selection of method 
The research question tries to explore what is happening in 
industry concerning robustness testing, seeking hidden and new 
insights, and based on that generating new ideas and hypothesis 
for future research. Therefore to answer the research question, 
a research method that is exploratory in nature is required [33]. 
3.1.3 Definition of case study 
An exploratory multiple case study design has been used. 
When conducting this study we have used the guidelines 
described by Runeson and Höst [33], detailing five major 
process steps that we walk through as shown in Table 1. 
 
3.2 Preparation 
In this section, the strategies for data collection (what, why, 
how, when) are defined. 
 
3.2.1 Defining of interview questions  
To define interview questions we adopted steps described in 
[34]  to work in a structured and iterative manner. Initially, as 
summarized in Section 2, the state-of-the-art knowledge was 
surveyed to understand the existing knowledge of robustness 
testing. Next, key areas were identified and interview questions 
were developed by considering the main aspects of robustness 
testing found in scientific literature. The interview questions 
were developed in iterative fashion, exploiting the perceptions, 
opinions, experiences and beliefs of all the co-authors of this 
paper. The development of the interview questions took three 
months of time during which all authors contributed in the 
review and iterative refinement of the interview questions. The 
work was coordinated by the first author of this paper. The 
interview questions were designed such that the answers would 
provide insight into the state of the practices in robustness 
testing of embedded software systems. Most of the interview 
questions were open-ended to give an opportunity to ask 
follow-up questions and thereby encouraging exploratory 
discussions. Table 2 presents the interview questions used in 
this study, categorized by important aspects of robustness 
testing of embedded software systems.  
 
3.2.2 Selection of interviewees 
Two channels were used in selection of interviewees, some 
from industrial contacts in our network and some from browsing 
profiles of experts of robustness testing on LinkedIn1. We 
consequently made use of a convenience sampling for the sake 
of interviewee selection. The focus was to select experts located 
in a sufficient proximity to the first author (Stockholm, Sweden) 
to allow for face to face interviews. 
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“610.12-1990 IEEE “The degree to which a system or component can 
function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental 
conditions” 
SI1: Do you agree with the given IEEE definition of robustness? If not, what 
is your definition? 
SI2: What are the key aspects of a robust software system in your domain? 
 
Requirements 
for  robustness 
testing 
SI3: What are robustness requirements in general? 
SI4: Do you have specific examples of robustness requirements? 





SI6: How do you ensure that you have designed a test for robustness? What 





SI7: Describe how you perform software system robustness testing in 
practice?   
SI8: Do you have specific staff member(s) in your organization who work on 
robustness (testing?) of a software/system? In what roles? If not, who is 
responsible? 
SI9: Do you explicitly measure robustness in your software system? If yes, 
how? 
S10: If you test specifically for robustness, do you run these tests on the target 




SI11: In your system(s), what would you say are the most common types of 
robustness failures? 
SI12: Do you classify failures? How? 
SI13: What things (faults) can cause such failures? 
 
Tools used for 
robustness 
testing 
SI14: Which tools do you use for test execution, design, preparation and 
verdict for robustness testing? 
SI15: What are the functions of tools that are most useful, with respect to 
robustness testing? 
SI16: What are the functions in tools that are missing?  
SI17: What type of support (tool or other) would you ideally like to use with 
respect to robustness testing? 
 
Additional SI18: Is there something that you want to add additionally considering the 
asked questions? 
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The interview subjects were selected based on their experience 
of robustness testing of embedded software system. Software 
testers and test managers are considered in this regard to make 
this study authentic and reliable. In total thirteen interviews were 
conducted. Twelve of the interviewees were male and only one 
was female. All interviewees have at least five years’ experience 
of testing embedded software in general and at least three years’ 
experience of robustness testing of embedded software systems 
in particular, as shown in Table 3.  
 
3.2.3 Pilot interview  
One pilot interview was conducted, with the intention to 
evaluate that the interview questions are sufficiently easy to 
understand. The pilot interview did not result in any major 
changes to the interview questions, as the subject expressed no 
difficulties in understanding the questions and answering them. 
However the interviewee made us aware of some minor 
improvements with respect to the interview protocol and pre-
interview information. These were subsequently altered 
accordingly. 
3.2 Evidence collection 
 
This section describes how the evidence is collected. The 
conduction of the interviews as well as the analysis of the 
responses are described in detail. 
 
3.2.1 Interview 
The interview was conducted in two sessions; the training 
session, and the interview execution session. The training 
session lasted for about ten minutes in which the brief agenda 
of conducting this particular study and associated research 
objectives were explained to the interviewees. In addition, we 
explained the existing definitions of software robustness 
present in the scientific literature. Afterwards, the interviewees 
were requested to ask clarifying questions in order to remove 
any ambiguity related to the interview. The execution session 
was the one in which the formal interview was conducted. The 
open-ended interview questions gave opportunity to lead a good 
discussion and gave us enough freedom to ask follow-up 
questions. This also led to further exploration from the 
contextual viewpoint, where the interviewees started to give 
examples from their specific context.  
 
3.2.2 Evidence collection method 
The evidence was collected by two means, manually taking 
notes of each interview question and also by recording the 
interviews using a digital recorder. This method of evidence 
capturing was chosen to not lose any relevant information and 
to allow for all authors to hear the responses and participate in 
the analysis work. All interviews were conducted in English. 
The first author conducted all interviews. Eleven interviews 
were conducted face to face, one interview was conducted by 
phone and one was by Skype. The duration of the interviews 
varied between 35 and 60 minutes. 
 
3.3 Evidence Analysis 
 
The evidence from the interviews consists of the written notes 
and the recorded audio. The sequence number and 
categorization of interview questions helped us to first process 
the interview questions in a spread sheet. Thereafter we added 
the written notes of each interview for each corresponding 
interview question.  
We reviewed all the audio contents of the interviews and 
added relevant information that were not captured in the 
handwritten notes. In some cases, a few statements directly 
constituted the answers to the interview questions and these 
answers were extracted from the transcribed interviews and 
inserted in the spreadsheet as they were. However for the 
detailed answers and examples we applied the “Notice, Collect, 
and Think” technique on the transcribed outputs of the 
interviews [35]. This is a non-linear qualitative analysis model, 
which consists of three phases; noticing, collecting and thinking 
phases. The analysis work was divided among the authors so 
that at least two researchers independently listened to the 
interviews and contributed to the analysis of each robustness 
testing aspect (see Table 2). The results described in Section 4 
are based on a mutual agreement for each such aspect, i.e., in 
each subsection. In the ‘Notice’ phase, the detailed points, 
reasoning, and examples as highlighted by the interviewees are 
considered. In the ‘Collect’ phase, the similar and different 
answers of each domain are arranged and grouped together. In 
the ‘Think’ phase, analysis was carried out by applying critical 
thinking on the grouped answers to extract meaningful findings. 
To avoid subjective findings from the interviews at least two 
researchers independently contributed to the analysis of each 





Below, we provide the summarized synthesis of the answers 
to the interview questions, organized by the previously derived 
key aspects of robustness testing.   
 
4.1 Definition of robustness testing 
 
The IEEE 610.12-1990 definition of robustness (i.e., “The 
degree to which a system or component can function correctly 
in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental 
conditions”) is generally accepted by the respondents, but in 
most cases we could see that the respondents either did not use 
any definition in their organization or that they had additions. 
In particular, the following statements were made by the 
interviewees: 
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Table 3 Overview of interviews, companies, and participants 







1 Telecom L Test Manager 5+ 15+ 
2 Telecom L Program Manager 5+ 10+ 
3 Telecom S Tester 3+ 5+ 
4 Telecom M Test Manager 15+ 25+ 
5 Automotive L Test Manager 4+ 7+ 
6 Automotive M Test Director 5+ 20+ 
7 Multimedia 
(IPTV) 
L Tester 3+ 5+ 
8 Multimedia 
(IPTV) 
M Tester 3+ 5+ 
9 Multimedia 
(IPTV) 
S Tester 3+ 5+ 
10 Aerospace L Test Manager 5+ 15+ 
11 Banking L Test Director 5+ 20+ 
12 Consumer 
Products 





L Test Manager 5+ 25+ 
   Average 5+ 12.5+ 
 
 “It is acceptable if the system fails but it is troublesome if 
the system accepts everything and does not fail. The system 
failing and then recovering in all circumstances is 
robustness to me” 
 “Robustness is not only handling a stressful environment, 
but handling a misbehaving environment including any 
connected equipment” 
 “Whatever the input is, the system should never provide 
faulty output, but rather go in safe or idle state” 
 
Moreover, several interviewees mentioned the system’s 
ability to cope with noise, attacks and malicious data. The 
responses from the aerospace and automotive domain stated 
that they normally do not use the term robustness. Robustness, 
in these domains, is a property that is connected to safety and 
the system should end up in a safe state in response of a failure. 
Robustness is handled implicitly by following standards such 
as DO-178B, rather than addressed explicitly as a non-
functional property. The interviewees from the multimedia and 
telecom domains stated that they use the term robustness even 
though they, in most cases, did not use the IEEE definition. 
Robustness for most of the interviewees in these domains is a 
property that is connected to the system’s ability to make a 
quick recovery and that the system’s behavior when failing is 
predictable. One of the interviewees (telecom) stated that they 
make a distinction between robustness and redundancy, which 
are two different aspects when it comes to failure scenarios. 
This view on robustness might differ between multimedia and 
telecom since another interviewee (multimedia) stated that 
fault-tolerance also is part of robustness. 
 
4.2 Key aspects of robust embedded software systems 
 
In the domains of telecom and multimedia, the interviewees 
pointed out no single point of failure and graceful degradation 
as the key aspects. For example, one of the interviewees 
mentioned that it is tolerable if some transactions are rejected 
but the already accepted transactions should be completed and 
the primary functions should always work. The system should 
always respond and be available for remote recovery. The two 
interviewees from the automotive domain also pointed out 
graceful degradation as a key aspect. In addition they 
mentioned the importance of predictable behavior over time 
and the need of having a backup plan that handles problems as 
an option to transfer the system into a safe state whenever there 
is a need for this. The interviewee from the critical 
infrastructure domain focused on no single point of failure and 
mentioned the use of a hot stand-by computer, which is ready 
to take over whenever there is a problem with the main 
computer. The interviewee from the aerospace domain 
highlighted such requirements as no catastrophic failures for 
109 flight hours. End user behavior and experience are other 
aspects that some of the interviewees pointed out as important 
in their organization. 
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4.3 Requirements for robustness testing 
 
The general requirements for robustness spans from the 
critical safety requirement of no catastrophic failures for 109 
flight hours in the aerospace domain to requirements on user 
experience and being robust enough to be accepted by 
customers. Availability seems to be a key aspect in all domains 
since this was mentioned by all in various terms such as no 
single-point of failure, hot standby, quality of service and 
quality of experience. Several of the interviewees also 
mentioned that they had requirements to handle specific 
scenarios such as overload, malicious traffic, or repetitive 
occurrences of restarts and failovers. Requirements specifying 
data integrity, failure rates, latency and response time were also 
mentioned. These requirements were elaborated by the 
interviewees who gave specific examples such as availability of 
99.999% over time, systems achieving safety level 4, 
restoration time to be less than 2 seconds, and response time in 
milliseconds. When it comes to the general requirement of no 
failures for 109 flight hours in the aerospace domain, this 
requirement applies to all critical parts of the system. For 
example, the control system is critical and must meet the 
requirement and so must therefore, all components between the 
control system and the pilot.  
The origins of robustness requirements were limited to 
different combinations of three sources: customers, regulatory 
standards, and the own organization. Most of the subjects 
explicitly stated that requirements come from customers, either 
directly or by taking into account customer’s experiences, 
behaviors and needs, for example, by monitoring customers’ 
behavior while visiting a web site. Some of the interviewees 
considered requirements to come from all three sources 
depending of the type of requirement. For example, 
requirements concerning safety usually come from regulatory 
standards while requirements on quality of service usually 
come from the own organization or agreements on the service 
level. A few of the subjects mentioned that they only have 
requirements from their own organization.  
 
4.4 Design for robustness testing 
 
Indications of any robustness-specific test design were quite 
limited among our interview subjects. Most of what is 
considered to fall under the category of robustness testing 
seems to take place on system level. With a few exceptions, the 
test design is ad hoc and experience-based rather than 
systematic. The few systematic test design techniques that are 
mentioned include boundary-value analysis and search-based 
simulation testing for identifying violations of resource 
                                                          
2 http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/7908799/xcu/lint.html 
[Accessed 17 November 2015] 
consumption requirements. A few of the subjects highlight the 
usage of an exploratory testing strategy for robustness testing. 
The main argument in favor of exploratory testing for 
robustness is that exploratory testing relies more on the 
experience and domain expertise of the tester, than on what is 
explicitly stated in the requirements. This argument is based on 
an assumption that many robustness requirements are implicitly 
assumed rather than explicitly stated, and thus not covered by 
traditional requirement-based testing. In addition, several 
interviewees (primarily in the telecom domain) mention the use 
of code inspection, and static and dynamic analysis tools (like 
Lint2 and Valgrind3) in the context of robustness testing. These 
analyses are primarily performed on lower levels of integration 
for identifying things like buffer overflows and memory leaks. 
While not solely targeting robustness, such issues are 
considered likely to impact the overall robustness of the system 
under test. 
 
4.5 Performing robustness testing 
 
Based on the responses of the interview subjects, we can 
identify three different organizational approaches to robustness 
testing: 
A. Organizations where no dedicated robustness testing 
staff or teams exist, and where no robustness-specific 
testing is mandated by standards or internally defined 
procedures. 
B. Organizations where no dedicated robustness testing 
staff or teams exist, but robustness-specific testing is 
mandated by standards or internally defined 
procedures. 
C. Organizations where dedicated staff or teams do exist 
for robustness testing, and where robustness-specific 
testing is mandated by standards or internally defined 
procedures. 
Note that in approach A, organizations may still perform 
robustness testing in practice, but they may not think about this 
activity as robustness testing per se. Robustness-relevant tests 
may be considered as performance, maintainability or stability 
testing. Consequently, there is a gray scale between the A and 
B approaches, and most of the organizations of our interviewees 
seem to fall somewhere within this scale. In fact, out of our 
studied organizations, only the telecom organizations fall in the 
C approach. Robustness tests typically originate from 
considering potential unintended, unwanted or unexpected 
scenarios occurring in the intended environment of the system 
under test. Such scenarios may include system restart, overload, 
power failure, cable failure, failure of peripherals or system 
3 http://valgrind.org [Accessed 17 November 2015] 
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misuse. The purpose of dedicated robustness tests is to evaluate 
the capability of the system under test to cope with these 
scenarios. In the cases where robustness is measured by a 
generic metric during testing, this is typically done from the 
perspective of an end-user system-quality attribute. To some 
extent, these quality attributes are domain specific. However, 
for most of the studied organizations, different measures of 
availability and uptime seem to be the primary attributes. 
Ideally, the availability of the system under test should not be 
unreasonably negatively affected by a robustness stressor (like 
the restart of a subsystem). Some interviewees also mention 
lower-level measurements, like communication performance 
and memory consumption over time, as indicators of robustness 
problems.  While all interviewees state that robustness testing 
is conducted on the target platform (i.e., actual hardware, actual 
software, but often simulated environment), a few of the 
interviewees state that some robustness testing is also 
conducted on a virtual platform. Most of our interviewees claim 
that they have, or are working towards a high level of test 
execution automation. 
4.6 Robustness Failures 
 
The results show that there are many different types of 
robustness failures. Among these, crashes are the most common 
(almost all of the interviewees). Other common robustness 
failures are caused by performance related issues, restarts, as 
well as CPU and memory related issues.  
In general, it is not a common practice to classify the failures. 
Except for two, all interviewees indeed stated that they do not 
classify their failures. However the two interviewees, who do 
classify failures, mentioned that they classify as they concern 
safety, i.e. which failures lead the system to enter a safe or 
unsafe state. Failures may be classified as crashes and reboot, 
memory failures, performance problems, response/latency 
(telecom, multimedia), or timing constraints (automotive, 
multimedia). Others classify by system reliability, in terms of 
catastrophic or non-catastrophic failures, or by the severity of 
impact on the system. Some rule out the possibility of 
catastrophic failures in the final product by design (telecom, 
aerospace). The overwhelming reason for robustness failures 
was quoted as the sheer complexity of the system. Other 
possible reasons for robustness failures were given as lack of 
understanding of the environment, improper memory 
addressing, fragmentation issues, configuration issues, 
integration issues, and issues related to geometrical 
transformation.  
 
4.7 Robustness testing tools 
 
The results show that in general the tools used for robustness 
testing are built in-house, open-source customized in-house, 
proprietary or open source. The useful functionality in these 
robustness-testing tools is to provide help in monitoring, such 
as status reports and visualization of trends over a chain of 
activities, generation and control of large streams of data, 
providing flexibility in adding and editing scenarios, and the 
ability to replay tests. The main challenge associated with 
robustness testing tools is a universal tool that handles the 
whole system and considers different scenarios, simulates the 
environment and replays the tests. Table 4 describes the 
summary of robustness testing tools in practice. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
This section summarizes the results from the interviews and 
discusses the differences between state of the art and state of 
the practice. We also discuss the threats to validity for our study 
in section 5.3.  
5.1 Summary of results 
The conduction of this case study in an industrial context 
allows us to publish information on state of the practice of 
robustness testing. We inquired about different aspects of 
robustness testing and the answers can be summarized for a 
particular sample of interviewees with the following pieces of 
evidence: 
The IEEE definition of performing robustness is commonly 
accepted among interviewees, however there are some 
additional considerations concerning robustness. The most 
commonly brought up aspect of robust embedded software 
system is availability. However no single point of failure, 
graceful degradation, ability for remote recovery, predictable 
behavior over time, and return to a safe state are the key aspects 
of embedded software systems. The common requirement of 
robustness testing of embedded software systems is the 
availability of the system in various terms. There are some 
requirements to handle specific scenarios and some 
requirements specifying data integrity, failure rates, latency and 
response time. Usually the requirements of robustness testing 
comes from three sources, the own organization, regulation 
standards and the customers. However, there is evidence in 
some domains that some requirements could come from just 
one or two of these sources. Robustness-test design is to a large 
extent ad hoc and experience based rather than systematic. 
Various organizations have different approaches to robustness 
testing, ranging from no dedicated teams and no defined 
process, to dedicated teams and defined process. Robustness 
tests typically originate from different scenarios, where the 
purpose is to evaluate the capability of the system and measure 
different quality attributes such as availability. Mostly 
robustness testing is conducted on the target platform (i.e., 
actual hardware, actual software, and often simulated 
environment). Crashes are the most common robustness 
failures compared to performance related issues, restarts, or 
CPU and memory related issues. In general, robustness failures 
are not classified into categories. 
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Table 4 Summary of Robustness Testing Tools 
Issue Domain 








90% in-house or open 
source and in-house 
tools. 
Tools that generate 
traffic load, in-house 
tools and open source. 






and Python scripts. 
MUnit, CUnit, and JUnit, as 
well as in-house tool. 
Automated availability tools. 






combinations of open 
source and customized in-
house tools.  
Mostly open source and 
in-house built tools. 
No specific tool. 
Open-source test 
execution tool Mocha. 
Most useful 
functions of the 
tools 
Ability to control large 
data streams, flexibility 
in traffic generation and 
data volume. 
Traffic generation, load 
profile, ability to 
generate malicious 
traffic. 









All parts are needed, chain 
of activities, defining 
specifications and reusing 
tests. 
Automatic system testing 
and system coverage are 
useful and necessary. 
 
Load generation. 
Statistics on sequences of 
requests and replies; 
model of traffic, manually 
provoking the system.  




control system, certifying 
separate pieces. 
The ability to define 
many conditions, to scan 
full range, and cross-
check; a configurable tool 
that can treat external 
events and input from 




of the tools 
The ability to handle 
physical events, such as 
pulling cables and cards, 




traceability, replay and 
record features. 
The ability to allow 
hands on testing; editing 
and adding scenarios. 
No missing function.  
 
The ability to get a complete 
overview, after a test; ability 
to analyze.  
Ability to automate testing 
for various hardware on the 
system level; ability to reuse 
tests. 
Ability to condense the 
complete system in a 
specification; to make it less 
expensive to maintain and 
test the system. 
Need a single tool, 
handling all types of 
systems, with various 
kinds of traffic. 
Fuzzing tools to add 
fuzzing parameters in 
load test. 
We develop customized 
in-house tools using 
open-source tools when 
we need specific results. 
The ability to simulate the 
whole system including 
all component; the ability 
to detect unwanted 
functionality. 
Flexibility and 
configurability; ability to 
model natural variations 
in in the environment 
such as signals, voltages, 
vibrations, etc.  
Support desired for 
robustness testing 
The ability to see what 
is happening in reality; 
creating a track model 
and environment model, 
that keeps up with new 
platforms. 
A better traffic 
generator; tools are not 




A tool that would be 
flexible in editing and 
adding scenarios. 
We use mostly in-house 
and open source; we are 
flexible, as the interface 
is a programming 
language. 
 
A synced instrument cluster 
display to support playback, 
with visualization of all 
variables including 
deviations from desired 
signals. 
Support for test automation. 
Full system functional 
coverage; automate all 
system testing; complete 
system overview in one tool. 
A multi-purpose tool, 
handling different sorts of 
traffic. The testers would 
only need to learn one 
tool. 
Being able to define more 
flexible and reproducible 
tests, based on API 
definitions; a mix 
between fuzzer and load 
test. 
We are flexible in 
developing our tools. This 
complements tools with 
expensive licenses, also 
for test automation. 
 
Need support for whole 
system level behavior by 
simulation, to detect how. 
Implicit assumptions may 
surface as unwanted 
behavior; we have 
considered using Matlab, 
as a good developing 
method. 
Ability to make changes 
in the framework more 
easily. 
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The common causes of robustness failures are found to be 
complexity of the system, lack of understanding of 
environment, memory addressing, fragmentation issues, 
configuration issues, integration issues and geometrical 
transformations. The tools used for robustness testing are built 
in-house, open source customized in-house, proprietary or open 
source. The tools provide help in monitoring tests by 
visualizing, controlling, revising, and replaying them.  
The main challenge associated with robustness testing tools 
is a universal tool that handles the entire system and considers 
various scenarios. The common causes of robustness failures 
are found to be the complexity of the system, lack of 
understanding of the environment, memory addressing, 
fragmentation issues, configuration issues, integration issues 
and geometrical transformations.  
 
5.2 Discussion of summary 
 
Our interviews provide us with a sample of the state of the 
practice based on thirteen experienced testers from various 
industrial domains. Such a study can, of course, never be more 
than a snapshot view of the activities and methods used at the 
companies where the interviewees work. With that said, there 
are some clear differences between the state of the art as 
described in Section 2 and the results we got from our 
interviewees, which we discuss here.  
Concerning robustness definition, the state-of-the-art IEEE 
definitions is accepted by most of the interviewees. The 
argument of one interviewee that robustness to him is not only 
a stressful environment but a misbehaving environment and 
connected equipment is very close to the definition proposed by 
Lussier et al. [13]. In addition, robustness in terms of the system 
entering into safe or unsafe state resembles the robustness 
definition proposed by Fernandez et al. [2]. The most common 
state-of-the-art approaches of performing robustness testing, 
i.e. the fuzz approach [14] and the benchmarking approach [15], 
are unfamiliar to the interviewees. Although they may be 
following a similar procedure of performing robustness testing 
to some extent, none of the interviewees explicitly mentioned 
following such published approaches. On the other hand 
interviewees are performing robustness testing taking into 
account scenarios that may include things like system restart, 
overload, power failure, cable failure, failure of peripherals or 
system misuse that is not evident in the state of the art. In state 
of the art, the robustness failures are classified according to the 
CRASH failure categorization [15]. In practice, however, all the 
interviewees stated that they do not classify failures based on 
any such categorization 
This does not imply that the categorization is wrong, only that 
it does not seem to be used in practice. Concerning the causes 
of robustness failures, the state of the art [12][14][19] highlights 
some particular causes such as internal exception handling 
errors, unknown exceptions and segmentation faults. However, 
according to interviewees, complexity of the system, lack of 
understanding of the environment, and memory addressing are 
the common reasons of robustness failures. This may be 
obvious, as most of the state-of-the-art work only deals with 
robustness testing of operating systems, while our interviewees 
are performing robustness testing in several other contexts. 
Most of the state-of-the-art tools deal with the robustness 
testing of operating systems [16][18][19][22] and Java-based 
software [20][24]. These tools are well known and available. 
However, the tools used by interviewees are mostly built in-
house, and to some extent use open source but are customized 
in-house. 
 
5.3 Validity threats 
 
There are many threats to the validity of our findings as in 
any exploratory case study. We follow the guideline of Wohlin 
et al. [35] to identify potential threats.  
Construct validity refers to the extent to which the study 
focuses on what it is intended to focus on, e.g., whether the 
study instruments (interview questions) adequately capture the 
concepts we want to study. To reduce the threat related to the 
study instrument, we have designed the interview questions 
based on a primary survey of literature (to identify what should 
be explored) and an iterative refinement of the study 
instruments among all authors of this study. We have further 
selected interviewees that have at least three years of robustness 
testing experience with more than five years of general testing 
experience. Another potential threat related to construct validity 
is that the interview is answered by guessing what the 
researcher has in mind rather than answering the question. To 
reduce this threat we used open-ended questions, asking the 
interviewee explicitly to give their answers in terms of 
describing examples from their fields and made sure to not 
intervene during their answers. Finally, there is a potential 
threat related to the misinterpretation of interviewees’ answers 
during the analysis phases. To reduce this threat, we have used 
a formal process of data extraction and analysis as described in 
sections 3.2 0, where the formal procedure helps to not 
misinterpret or lose any information. In addition all interviews 
were recorded and each recording was analyzed by at least two 
of the co-authors. 
Internal validity is often less sensitive in exploratory studies 
[36], however there are still some threats relevant to mention. 
The sample size of each domain under study was relatively 
small, in most cases it is only one, as shown in Table 3, and 
does not allow for any quantitative analysis. However, with 
stratified selection of interviewee subjects, we ensured that 
selection covers a broad area of different domains. Moreover, 
the interviewees share among them a fair amount of practical 
experience, which gives a high level of confidence for their 
answers to be representative when it comes to state of the 
practice in robustness testing.  
External validity concerns how the results can be generalized, 
and it is very specific for a case study, such as whether the 
conclusion can be generalized to the same and different 
domains. In our study we did include representations of various 
industrial domains of embedded software systems. There are 
some common practices and characteristics we found in the 
same domain and sometimes across various domains that are 
used. However we cannot say how commonly they are used 
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since we only can provide a snapshot from the companies we 
studied. Further studies, including more interviewees from 
different contexts are required to increase the confidence for our 
results. Reliability relates to the replication of the study and 
arriving at the same results. Replication requires a well-
documented design, a structured data collection process and a 
formal analysis procedure and this is the case for our study. It 
is, therefore, possible to keep the same design when the study 
is replicated and used to increase the empirical knowledge base 




This study investigates the state of the practice of robustness 
testing by conducting a multiple case study, where thirteen 
experienced practitioners in different organizations are 
interviewed. We provide a knowledge base of the state of the 
practice in robustness testing of embedded software systems 
and compare this to the state of the art. Although the state of the 
art describes issues and methods in robustness testing, state of 
the practice has not been explored and described to this extent 
in literature before. Moreover, robustness testing, as described 
in literature, focuses on the software alone and in most cases 
only on operating systems, rather than embedded software. Our 
study shows that the state of the practice when it comes to 
robustness testing is quite different from the state of the art 
described in the scientific literature. For example, the methods 
commonly described in literature (e.g., the fuzz approach) are 
not used in the organizations we studied. Instead, the 
interviewees describe several ad-hoc approaches that take 
specific scenarios into account (e.g., power failure or overload). 
Other differences we found concerns classification of 
robustness failures, the hypothesized root causes of robustness 
failures and the type of tools used for robustness testing. The 
knowledge base is useful for researchers as well as 
practitioners. Knowledge of the state of the practice is essential 
for researchers in order for them to create solutions that are 
feasible for industry and adaptive to industrial approaches. 
Practitioners can use the knowledge base to incorporate new 
approaches into their own test environment. 
A suggestion for future work is to extend the study. Our study 
only focuses on organizations situated in Sweden and, even 
though these organizations are mostly multi-national, it would 
be interesting to interview testers from other parts of the world. 
Another extension of this study is to include testing of other 
non-functional properties than robustness, such as performance 
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[28] A. Kövi and Z. Micskei, “Robustness Testing of Standard 
Specifications-Based HA Middleware,” Distrib. Comput. 
Syst. Workshop ICDCSW 2010 IEEE 30th Int. Conf. On, 
pp. 302–306, Jun. 2010. 
[29] Z. Micskei, I. Majzik, and F. Tam, “Robustness Testing 
Techniques for High Availability Middleware 
Solutions,” in Workshop on Engineering of Fault 
Tolerant Systems, 2006. 
[30] S. Ali, L. Briand, and H. Hemmati, “Modeling robustness 
behavior using aspect-oriented modeling to support 
robustness testing of industrial systems,” Softw. Syst. 
Model., vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 633–670, Oct. 2012. 
[31] N. Laranjeiro, R. Oliveira, and M. Vieira, “Applying 
Text Classification Algorithms in Web Services 
Robustness Testing,” Reliab. Distrib. Syst. 2010 29th 
IEEE Symp. On, pp. 255–264, Oct. 2010. 
[32] F. Belli, A. Hollmann, and W. E. Wong, “Towards 
Scalable Robustness Testing,” Secure Softw. Integr. 
Reliab. Improv. SSIRI 2010 Fourth Int. Conf. On, pp. 
208–216, Jun. 2010. 
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